Self-Monitoring in Speaking: In Defense of a Comprehension-Based Account.
Level 5 - mechanism / opinion, no new human data
Theoretical critique and conceptual argument without new primary empirical data
PubMed 32944681 · doi:10.5334/joc.61
What was done
The author theoretically evaluated three arguments raised against comprehension-based internal speech monitoring: cross-talk interference between inner and overt speech, reported double dissociations between comprehension and monitoring in patients with aphasia, and error-related negativity in the anterior cingulate cortex interpreted as unconscious conflict detection.
What was found
The abstract reports no empirical numbers or quantitative data. The author concluded through theoretical critique that none of the opposing arguments decisively rule out a comprehension-based account of self-monitoring in speaking.
Why it matters
The paper defends classical comprehension-based architectures of speech monitoring against newer production-based and conflict-detection accounts in psycholinguistics.
Limits
The paper is purely theoretical and presents no new primary experimental, clinical, or neuroimaging data. Its conclusions depend entirely on qualitative re-evaluation of previously published studies and models.
Cited by
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