Chaotic shop-talk or efficient parliament? The Reichstag, the parties, and the problem of governmental instability in the Weimar Republic
Level 4 - case-series / case-control
Historical observational data analysis (design analogy, non-clinical CEBM)
OpenAlex W2151280778 · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9505-0
What was done
Historical hypotheses explaining governmental instability in the Weimar Republic were re-examined using a dataset of 489 parliamentary roll-call bills spanning the 14-year period of the republic.
What was found
The abstract reports no numerical estimates, effect sizes, or statistical figures. It reports qualitatively that institutional conditions, internal systems, and parliamentary actors alone were unlikely to have caused governmental instability, indicating that the causes lie predominantly outside parliament.
Why it matters
Provides empirical roll-call data to challenge institution-centric explanations of the political instability that characterized the Weimar Republic.
Limits
The abstract provides no specific quantitative metrics, confidence intervals, or statistical test results. Roll-call votes may be subject to selection bias and do not capture informal backroom negotiations or non-recorded legislative actions.
Cited by
- context In the 1932 German Reichstag, all the people elected were either members of the far-right Nazi Party or the far-left Communist Party.