Vertical versus Horizontal Incentives in Education: Evidence from Randomized Trials
Level 2 - randomized trial
Randomized field trials (graded by design analogy for economics/education).
OpenAlex W2767075410 · doi:10.3386/w17752
What was done
Randomized field experiments were conducted across 84 urban public schools in two US cities to evaluate how incentive alignment affects student achievement. In Washington, DC, a horizontal incentive system rewarded students across multiple inputs (attendance, behavior, interim assessments, homework, and uniforms). In Houston, TX, a vertical incentive system rewarded multiple stakeholders (students, parents, and teachers) for a single input (math objectives).
What was found
Both models produced large and statistically significant gains on the specific outcomes directly incentivized, though no numerical point estimates or p-values were reported in the abstract. Horizontal incentives improved both math and reading test scores. Vertical incentives focused exclusively on math increased math achievement but led to decreased test scores in reading, science, and social studies.
Why it matters
This study demonstrates that while targeted incentives can boost performance in specific subjects, single-subject multi-agent incentives can distort effort away from untargeted academic areas.
Limits
The abstract omits exact numerical effect sizes, test score changes, and student/teacher sample sizes beyond the school count (84 schools). The two incentive models were tested in different cities with different target inputs rather than in a direct head-to-head factorial trial, which introduces potential contextual confounding. Long-term durability of gains was not reported.
Cited by
- contradicts By law, American public schools are prohibited from giving cash directly to students as incentives.