The political economy of sugar-sweetened beverage taxation in Latin America: lessons from Mexico, Chile and Colombia
Level 4 - case-series / case-control
Level 4 by design analogy (comparative qualitative policy case study)
OpenAlex W3120551747 · doi:10.1186/s12992-020-00656-2
What was done
The authors conducted a comparative political economy analysis using a qualitative synthesis of existing empirical evidence from Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. They identified key stakeholders involved in sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation policy, examined their interests, and evaluated how pro- and anti-tax coalitions influenced tax adoption and implementation across the three countries.
What was found
The abstract reports purely qualitative findings and contains no numerical data. Across all three countries, opposing coalitions formed around SSB taxation. Strong intergovernmental support was identified as a critical driver for framing policy goals and achieving tax adoption. Conversely, intense lobbying and agenda-setting influence by transnational corporations (TNCs), coupled with limited transparency, served as a primary constraint against tax adoption and implementation.
Why it matters
Understanding the political economy of fiscal health policies illustrates how corporate power shapes public health legislation in middle-income countries. It underscores the need for transparency mechanisms to prevent commercial conflicts of interest from undermining chronic disease prevention efforts.
Limits
The abstract provides no quantitative metrics or details on the literature search, screening, or qualitative coding methodology. Findings are limited to three Latin American countries and rely on secondary qualitative synthesis rather than direct empirical outcome evaluation.
Cited by
- context In Mexico, when a tax was placed on soda, it was fought by companies like Coca-Cola and reversed.